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INTRODUCTION
More than fifteen years -ago Virginia made a very im-
portant and progressive modification of the rules of
practice and procedure in actions at law and suits in
equity. The promulgation of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1950 substituted a modern system
for an archaic, outmoded, and cumbersome one. Under
the Rules litigants can state their case and plead in a
brief and succinct manner, unhampered with unneces-
sary and ancient verbiage. There is less emphasis on
form and more on substance, -and this facilitates the bet-
ter administration of justice. Generally, the Rules have
unquestionably served the purposes which motivated
their adoption, and the bench and bar have been reason-
ably satisfied with the utilization of the present system.
RULE 3:23 OF THE RULES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
The one exception which has caused some concern,
and which has been the subject of much discussion and
perhaps of more varied interpretations by the trial
courts and trial lawyers,' is Rule 3:23, particularly sub-
part (c), which was adopted in 1954. Rule 3:23 is general-
ly known as the discovery rule. It is divided into four
subparts.
'Boyd, Pleading and Practice, 1962-63 Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
49 VA. L. Rnv. 1621, 1624 (1963).
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Subpart (a) sets forth the procedure for objecting
to the taking of de bene esse depositions. Upon a motion
being made to quash the notice to take such deposition,
the Court shall quash such notice unless satisfied that
the taking of the deposition is in good faith.
Subpart (b) is a novel provision prohibiting discovery
of an expert witness whose first connection with the case
was his employment to give his opinion as an expert.
The Rule states that the deposition of such witness can
only be taken at the instance of the party who employed
him. There is perhaps no counterpart to this Rule in any
other state or federal rule or statute. The intendment of
the Rule was to adopt the majority decisional rule in
the United States that neither the findings nor the opin-
ions of the expert can be discovered by depositions un-
less the expert is one of the parties to the litigation or is
an employee of one of the parties and has direct knowl-
edge of the facts because of such employment.2 Further
comment will be made with reference to subpart (b) un-
der the discussion of Federal Rule 30 (b).
Subpart (c) directs the trial court to allow discovery
in general upon a determination to its satisfaction "that
the moving party in good faith desires access, by way
of discovery, to evidence, the names and addresses of
witnesses, or other information subject to the control of
the adverse party or of a third person." The trial court
shall only deny the motion for discovery "if it finds
that granting the motion would unreasonably delay the
case or impose unreasonable hardship or expense on the
adverse party."
Subpart (d) permits the independent medical exam-
ination of a party if the pleadings raise an issue as to
the mental or physical condition of such party, and the
2Annot., 86 A. L. R. 2d 138 (1962); Cooper v. Norfolk Redevelopment
and Housing Authority. 197 Va. 653, 90 S. E. 2d 788 (1956); Hornback
v. State Highway Commissioner, 205 Va. 50, 135 S.E. 2d 136 (1964).
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introduction of the report of the examining doctor by the
party who submitted to the examination. The intent and
purpose of this part of Rule 3:23 are substantially the
same as Rule 35 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.'
RISTORY OF RULE 3:23
Rule 3:23 was not adopted until 1954. During the first
four years of the new Rules there was no rule in effect
pertaining to discovery. In the report of the Judicial
Council for Virginia to the General Assembly and the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for 1954 and 1955,
the following brief historical background is given with
regard to the adoption by the Supreme Court on March
17, 1954, of Rule 3:23:
The year 1954 was noteworthy for the adoption of
a new Rule pertaining to Depositions and Discovery.
A rule relative to depositions for discovery was in-
cluded in the Proposed Modifications of Practice
and Procedure prepared by the Judicial Council in
January, 1949. The proposed rule read as follows:
"RULE 16.
"Depositions taken pursuant to the provisions of
a statute may be used for purposes of discovery.
Parties and their agents may be required to answer
any relevant question the answer to which is not
privileged and may be required to give the names
and addresses of witnesses."
The explanation given for this proposed rule at
the time was as follows:
"Rule 16, permitting depositions to be used for
3See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U. S. 104 (1964), which states that
"Rule 35 on its face applies to all 'parties', which under any normal read-
ing would include a defendant."
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purposes of discovery, makes no change in the pres-
ent law. Code Section 6225 (§8-304 Va. Code of
1950) allows either party to take the other party's
deposition; and the familiar rule of evidence allows
anything relevant to the case said by a party to be
introduced in evidence against him as an admis-
sion."
When the Rules of Court were adopted on Octo-
ber 13, 1949, proposed Rule 16 regarding deposi-
tions for discovery was not included in the final
draft because the Council had reached the conclusion
that no rule of court on this subject was necessary.
In 1951 and 1952 many members of the bench and
bar in Virginia became concerned about the growing
use of depositions for discovery. These depositions
were being taken under authority of §§8-304 and
8-305 of the Virginia Code of 1950. In some cases
the taking of these depositions amounted to what
lawyers termed "fishing expeditions." Some judges
of courts of record began to rule against the taking
of such depositions while other judges allowed the
practice. Under these circumstances the Judicial
Council recognized that there was confusion in re-
gard to the proper interpretation of the statutes,
and that a rule was needed for clarification. Accord-
ingly, the Chairman of the Judicial Council appoint-
ed a committee to study a suggested rule on deposi-
tions.
This committee did a great deal of work, and
various proposed rules during a period of about two
years were discussed by the Judicial Conference,
the Virginia State Bar, and the Virginia State Bar
Association. Finally, on March 17th, 1954, Rule 3:23,
a new Rule, was recommended and adopted to be
effective on July Ist, 1954.
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It is interesting to note that Rule 3:23 was adopted not
only to establish some uniformity in discovery procedure
in Virginia but also to contain the practice within the
guide lines fixed in the Rule because of the increased use
of discovery depositions under the statute without the
limitations of a rule. It is important to understand this
genesis of Rule 3:23, with its restricted right of dis-
covery, because this procedural philosophy has per-
meated and influenced the various and conflicting con-
cepts of the trial courts.
Within five years after the adoption of Rule 3:23 there
was a growing opinion among the bar that there should
be some broadening of discovery procedure under the
Rules. There was little uniformity of interpretation of
the Rule by the trial courts, and this made it difficult
for the trial lawyer to know when or to what extent he
would be permitted to undertake discovery procedure.
For instance, in the original Rule there was no positive
provision for discovering the names and addresses of
the witnesses of the adverse party, and many trial
courts would not allow such discovery. The reasons ad-
vanced several years ago in support of procuring such
information about witnesses are accepted today without
question, and the names and addresses of witnesses are
exchanged willingly and freely among the trial bar with-
out the formality of even a court order. Each party now
knows before trial all of the known eyewitnesses, all of
the medical witnesses and their specialties, and any other
witnesses who may be called. The element of surprise is
eliminated, as it should be in the arena of justice.
It may have been intended, by subpart (a) of the ori-
ginal Rule 3:23, that the names and addresses of wit-
nesses were discoverable, but it was necessary to add
several definitive words to the Rule in 1961 to accom-
plish this purpose.
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AMENDMENT OF RULE 3:23
Subpart (c) of Rule 3:23 was amended, effective April
1, 1961, and is set out here, with the words stricken out
by the amendment being enclosed in brackets and the new
matter italicised:
Rule 3:23. Depositions [under Code Sections 8-304
and 8-305] and Discovery in Actions at Law.
(c) On motion of any party, the court, if satisfied
by affidavit, testimony, inspection of the pleadings
or otherwise that the moving party [should have]
in good faith desires access by way of discovery to
evidence, the names and addresses of witnesses, or
other information subject to the control of the ad-
verse party or of a third person, [may] shall permit
the taking of a deposition for discovery and [may]
shall enter an order requiring the adverse party or
such third person to attend at a time and place and
before a notary or commissioner named in the order
and to make available for inspection, copying or
photographing any writing, chattel or real property
described in the order. The court shall deny the
motion if it finds that granting the motion would un-
reasonably delay the case or impose unreasonable
hardship or expense on the adverse party.
The permissive word "may" was changed to the man-
datory word "shall," but certain restrictive language
was added "to avoid abuses." Although the amendment
was intended to decrease the unlimited discretion of the
trial judge, to make uniform its application, and to give
more discovery, the addition of a few words to the ori-
ginal context again resulted in conflicting interpretations
and a dichotomy of procedural concepts. The amendment
provided that the moving party has to satisfy the court
that he wants the discovery in good faith, and having
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done that, theiRule says that the discovery shall be grant-
ed unless granting it would cause delay or unreasonable
expense."
The present Rule 3: 2 3(c) has not brought about a
uniform pattern of discovery in Virginia, and it has not
resulted in more discovery. The original philosophy of
containment still pervades. This is understandable to
some extent when it is considered that the original rule
was retained with amendatory verbiage which had an
enlarging purpose but was still wrapped in discretionary
guide lines. Does the moving party in good faith desire
discovery? Would discovery cause unreasonable delay?
Would it impose unreasonable hardship or expense upon
the adverse party? These are matters which the trial
judges are directed to rule upon, and many consider the
Rule as being restrictive, and even though they may
grant some discovery, they limit its scope.
PURPOSE OF DISCOVERY
What is the true and proper function of discovery? In
City of Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello5 the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia said:
The purposes of the rule [3:23(c)] are to aid in
the dispatch of litigation, to encourage the settle-
ment of cases, to reduce the issues so as to shorten
time consumed in trial and to prevent surprise.
The preambles to a Joint Resolution ' adopted by the
General Assembly of Virginia during its 1960 session,
4 See Speech delivered to the Judicial Conference of Virginia, May 11,
1962, by Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., Esquire, who is a member of the Judicial
Council and who participated in the framing of Rule 3:23(c); City of
Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 129 S.E. 2d 31 (1963). See also,
1 U. RicH. L. N. 215 (1961).
5204 Va. 11, 14; 129 S.E. 2d 31, 33 (1963).
6House Joint Resolution No. 88, Acts of 1960, p. 1082.
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requesting the Judicial Council to study further the
matter of discovery, were as follows:
WHEIREAS, such practice could be established for
uniform application throughout this State; and
WHEREAS, this procedure might better serve the
ends of justice by requiring full disclosure of both
the plaintiff's and defendant's testimony in certain
circumstances; and
WHEREAS, such procedure might speed the cause
of justice; ....
Similar purposes of the federal pre-trial discovery
procedure have been repeatedly asserted:
1. To narrow the issues.
2. To provide evidence for trial.
3. To produce testimony reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.
4. To assist in ascertaining the truth and in checking
and preventing perjury.
5. To detect and expose false, fraudulent, and sham
claims and defenses.
6. To make available in a simple, convenient, and often
inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not
have been proved except with difficulty, and some-
times not at all.
7. To educate the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defenses, thereby en-
couraging settlements out of court.
7Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). Accord, 2A Barron &
Holtzoff, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §646, at 10 (rules ed. Wright
1961); 4 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.01(7), at 1009 (2d ed. 1950).
See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv.
940, 944-48 (1961); 48 Va. L. Rev. 122, 124 (1962).
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8. To expedite the disposal of litigation.
9. To safeguard against surprise at trial, and to nar-
Tow and simplify the issues.'
In Hicknan v. Taylor,' the Court said:
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism es-
tablished by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most sig-
nificant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, the
pre-trial functions of notice giving, issue-formula-
tion and fact-revelation were performed primarily
and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the
issues and the facts before trial was narrowly con-
fined and was often cumbersome in method ... [Un-
der the new procedure, however] civil trials in the
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the
dark. The way is now clear . . . for the parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial .... 10
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To
that end, either party may compel the other to dis-
gorge whatever facts he has in his possession .... 1
BROADER DISCOVERY PROPOSALS
It is apparent that the intended purposes of discovery
in Virginia are the same as those in the federal courts.
If this be so, then what are the best means of attaining
the ultimate goals of uniform discovery procedure -as
well as more discovery? Can this be done by adding a
few words, a phrase, a clause, a sentence, or even a para-
84 Moore Federal Procedure 26.02 (2d ed. 1950), at 1034; 74 HAMw.
L. Rnv. at 944-946.
0329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'lId. at 500 (dictum).
1
"Id. at 507.
196 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES
graph to Rule 3:23(c) 7 Although this procedure has not
proven effective in the past, there is some opinion which
suggests that Rule 3:23 can be amended12 so as to change
the philosophy of containment and restriction, to dispel
any ambiguities, and to minimize, if not eliminate, any
judicial reservations as to the acceptance of discovery.'"
Instead of amending Rule 3:23, should we scuttle the
Rule and substitute in its place Rules 26 through 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are the rules
of discovery in federal civil trials? The Federal Rules
were promulgated by the United States Supreme Court
in 1938,' and they constituted the first comprehensive
scheme of discovery adopted in this country. They have,
over the intervening years, proven to be useful in in-
creasing the efficiency of the administration of justice
in the federal courts.'5
FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES
Rule twenty-six 6 provides that "any party" can take
a deposition of any other person "for the purpose of
discovery . . ." or to use as evidence, or for both pur-
poses. Except as limited by the court, the deposition may
cover any nonprivileged matter relevant to the claim or
defense of the examining party or his opponent, includ-
ing discovery as to the location [not production] of
books, records, or tangible things, and the identity and
location of persons who may have knowledge of relevant
facts. Evidence may be sought even though inadmissible
12The official text of any proposed amendments to rule 3:23 has not
been published.
'1Piecemeal reform is merely repeating the mistake of the past, Wright,
Procedural Reforms in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 87 (1959). "Code is
followed by commentary, and commentary by revision, and thus the task is
never done," CARDOZO, The Growth of the Law 135 (1924).
14308 U. S. 645 (1939).
154 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE t26.02 [2] (2d ed. 1962).
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b).
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at the trial, if it appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Rule thirty-three17 covers written interrogatories to
parties, which are addressed to and served directly on a
party.
Rule thirty-four"s deals with the production of docu-
ments and other objects for inspection, copying, or photo-
graphing. Unlike depositions and interrogatories, pro-
duction must be sought by court order.19 Upon a showing
of good cause, the order may compel the production and
copying of any nonprivileged materials constituting or
containing evidence relating to any of the matters with-
in the scope of examination permitted by Rule twenty-
six, subpart(b), and in the custody, possession, or control
of the party.
These provisions for depositions, interrogatories, and
discovery are subject to rule thirty, subpart (b),"0 by
which the court may limit the scope of the examination
for good cause and protect confidential or secret ma-
terial by in camera inspection. The court also may pro-
tect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, or oppression. Rule thirty, subpart (d),"' further
17Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
19In Virginia discovery depositions and the inspection, copying, or
photographing of any writing, chattel or real property, and the medical
examination of a party must be sought by court order; Rule 3:23. The
production of book accounts or other writing in possession of an adverse
party or claimant is sought by affidavit, and the clerk of the court then
issues a summons, requiring the proper officer to summon such adverse
party or claimant to produce such writing. Va. Code Ann. 1950 §8-324
(RepI. Vol. 1957). The production of any book, writing, or document in
the possession of a person not a party to the matter in controversy is
sought by affidavit, and upon order of the court the clerk of such court is
directed to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel such production. Va.
Code Ann. 1950 §8-301 (Repl. Vol. 1957). Effective June 27, 1966, it
will be necessary for the moving party to give notice to the adverse party
of the motion for such subpoena duces tecum. Senate Bill No. 253 adopted
by the General Assembly of Virginia, 1966.
2 0 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
21Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
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protects deponents by providing for motions to termi-
nate or limit the examination upon a showing of bad
faith or harrassment.
Upon the adoption of Rule 30 (b), some consideration
should perhaps be given to including in said Rule a
provision embodying the ease law which has developed
with respect to the discoverability of the findings and
opinions of expert witnesses.2 " In Virginia the discovery
deposition of an expert whose first connection with the
case is his employment to testify as a witness cannot be
taken. " This rule could be clarified with greater specific-
ity and made a part of Rule 30(b). In 1946, before Hick-
man v. Taylor " was decided, the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States Su-
preme Court proposed an amendment to Rule 30(b)
which would have protected from discovery any writing
reflecting the conclusions of an expert.25 The amendment
was not adopted by the Supreme Court. There was some
opposition on the grounds that "this [amendment] is too
restrictive." 26 The majority decisional rule of both the
federal and state courts prohibits the discovery of the
opinions of experts.
Some consideration may also be given to making some
provision for protecting the "work-product" of counsel.
In preparing such addition to Rule 30(b) it will be neces-
sary to define the "work-product" of the lawyer, ' al-
22Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 138 (1962), Pre-trial depositions-discovery of
opinions of opponent's expert witnesses; Emroch, Examination of Adver-
sary's Expert, PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL, 727 (1961); Emroch, The Ex-
pert Witness and the Hypothetical Question, VIRGINIA LAYWER'S HANDBOOK,
SOURCES OF PROOF IN PREPARING A LAWSUIT 93, 130, 132 (1964).
2
sRule 3:23(b).
24329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2 5The proposed amendment and committee note thereto are set out in
4 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2006-2012 (2d ed.).
264 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1157 (2d ed.).
2 7For an exhaustive discussion of the "work-product" doctrine, see
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1961).
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though this may be difficult to emcompass in a brief rule.
It has been suggested that the case law which began with
Hickman and which has developed during the intervening
years would suffice as interpreting guide lines for the
trial courts on this question of "work-product" without
requiring any amendment to Rule 30(b).
Rule thirty-five" provides for a physical or mental
examination by a physician of a party whose mental or
physical condition is in controversy. This is done by
order of the court on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the party to be examined. Upon request
the party examined may procure a copy of the report of
the examining physician. This procedure is very similar
to that provided by subpart (d) of Virginia Rule 3:23,
except that the written report of the examination is re-
quired to be filed with the court before the trial and a
copy furnished to each party.
Rule thirty-six provides for the admission of facts and
the genuineness of documents by permitting a party,
after commencement of an action, to serve on any other
party a written request for the desired admission. Such
matter is deemed admitted unless denied or objected to
in writing to the court within ten days. Such admission
constitutes an admission for purposes of the pending
action only. Virginia has, by statute,29 enacted the exact
same provisions of Rule 36 (a) and (b). If rules similar
to the Federal Rules are promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, the statute, of course,
would be repealed upon adoption of the comparable rule.
Virgia has already adopted by rule and statute sev-
eral of the Federal Rules of discovery, and, with some
minor tailoring, the other discovery Rules could be made
to fit into the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia.
28Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
29Va. Code Ann. 1950 §8.1-111 (RepI. Vol. 1957).
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REASONS FOR ADOPTION OF FEDERAL RULES
Some of the reasons which justify serious considera-
tion being given to the adoption in Virginia of the Fed-
eral Rules 26 through 37 are:
1. They have proven effective in aiding parties in the
preparation and presentation of their cases.
2. A large body of law interpreting the Rules has de-
veloped over the years and under familiar rules of con-
struction will prove of inestimable value to the courts in
decision-making concerning any problems arising un-
der similar rules which may be promulgated in Virginia.
3. Under the dual federal-state system of jurispru-
dence the task of the trial lawyer will be less burdensome
where the procedures are similar and uniform.
4. More discovery is permissible under the Federal
Rules, and this is as it should be to accomplish the fun-
damental purpose of discovery. The concern of improp-
er, unfounded, or harassing "fishing expeditions" has
not materialized. It is rarely that experienced and qual-
ified trial lawyers ever find it necessary to raise any such
objections to discovery depositions, for, although they
are thorough and exhaustive, they are nevertheless con-
ducted properly and kept within lawful bounds.
5. Settlements are expedited by their use. Counsel of-
ten invoke the discovery procedure to evaluate the claims
of injured parties where liability has been reasonably
fixed or determined. The congestion of court dockets is
relieved, and the heavy burden of the trial judges is
lessened.
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this writer that there is a con-
sensus among the trial lawyers of Virginia which favors
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because they do permit broader discovery and uniform-
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ity. At the annual meeting of the Virginia Trial Lawyers
Association held in March, 1965, an overwhelming ma-
jority of the trial lawyers voted in favor of such adop-
tion after hearing an excellent discussion of the question
by the Honorable Walter A. Page, Judge of the Court
of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia,
Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., Esquire, long-time member of the
Judicial Council of Virginia, and the Honorable George
M. Cochran, member of the Senate of Virginia and Pres-
ident of the Virginia State Bar Association. Any changes
in the rules of practice and procedure are of major con-
cern to the trial bar, and their composite knowledge and
experience should be given great weight in the determi-
nation of and decision as to any such changes.
Those in support of the adoption of the Federal Rules
are of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's persua-
sion. In our area arrangements have existed for some
time with counsel of defense firms for use in State pro-
ceedings of unlimited discovery which simulates the pro-
cedure under the Federal Rules. Under Federal Rule 26
a discovery deposition is taken on notice, and no order
of the court is required. Counsel agree on an appropriate
date and hour for the taking of the depositions, and the
parties appear without summons. Upon stipulation the
depositions are transcribed, filed in court, and can be
used at the trial, if necessary, for impeachment purposes.
Under Rule 3:23(c) an order authorizing and limiting
the scope of the taking of the depositions is required.
Since the lawyers in most instances voluntarily agree to
the taking of discovery depositions of their respective
clients, and on occasions other witnesses, much time of
the court and counsel can be saved by permitting such
taking of discovery depositions on notice. The use of the
depositions is also much broader under Federal Rule 26
than it is under Virginia Rule 3:23, and there are some
good reasons to justify such use.
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Discovery is a two-way street. It is and can be used by
the plaintiff and the defendant. There are no advantages
for either party. Its use is increasing, and it is being
utilized today more and more by both parties.
The ultimate goal of litigation and the proper ad-
ministration of justice is to seek out all of the facts and
justiciable issues to the end that the factual and scientific
truth may be established. Discovery has proven to be a
very vital and important tool in search of this goal.
The bench and the trial bar should be permitted the use
of this tool in their commitment to ferret out and to
present the truth in each case.
